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Abstract:   Corruption has opaque significant consideration for research-
ers during the last few decades due to its effect on economic 
growth. This study examines the relationship between cor-
ruption and economic growth in Pakistan, covering the peri-
od  from  1985  to  2010.  Stationarity  of  the  variables  was 
checked through unit root test and then apply multiple re-
gression technique. The results shows that government ex-
penditures,  education  expenditures  and  population  growth 
has a positive impact on per capita GDP, however, domestic 
investment and corruption has a negative impact on per cap-
ita income in Pakistan. It implies that corruption is a major 
factor impeding economic development. Corruption hampers Page 17  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
economic  growth,  disproportionately  burdens  the  poor  and 
undermines the effectiveness of investment and aid. 
Keywords:  Corruption;  Per  capita  GDP;  Education  expenditures;  Unit 
root test; Pakistan. 
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Introduction 
Concern about the negative social and economic impacts of corrup-
tion  has  grown  rapidly  in  both  emerging  economies  and  advanced  de-
mocracies.  Major  international  organizations  have  consequently  begun 
probing the sources and solutions for corruption. For example World Bank 
recognized corruption as the single utmost dilemma to economic and so-
cial development. It undermines development by falsification the rule of 
law and fading the institutional establishment on which economic growth 
depends.  Although  international  organizations  time  and  again  declare 
that corruption hinders economic growth, economists have not essentially 
agreed  with  contend  from  theoretical  standpoints.  As  the  government 
malfunction is itself a gist of corruption however, corruption should have 
injurious effects on economic growth in the long run. In practice, policy-
makers and economists mind more about such long-term cost of corrup-
tion than the instant belongings (Akai et al. 2005).  
Corruption can occur through various ways but deficiency and flaws 
of the watch-dog agencies is the major cause of corruption. Such agen-
cies are generally not gifted to address the larger forces inspiring general 
corruption. Most clearly, agencies cannot be effective in state of affairs 
where on the whole every key institution is compromised (Meagher and 
Voland,  2006).  Lack  of  sovereign  judiciary  can  lubricant  occurrence  of 
corruption because such form of judicial system dishonoured by bribery 
deteriorate confidence in supremacy by facilitating corruption across all Page 18  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
sectors of government. The efficiency of the Judiciary will be enhanced 
when there is Political support which is ultimately important and an effec-
tive approach that will assemble support within the political arrangement 
through alliances and stress on it (Ababa, 2007).  
Anticorruption  agencies  are  not  enough  to  negate  corruption  be-
cause  its  foundation  for  effective  corruption  activities  are  deep  rooted 
and endorse with lack of probable courts, political imbalances, regulatory 
incentives  toward  corruption  and  rent-seeking  activities  (Meagher  and 
Voland, 2006). If we highlight the consequence of corruption, existence 
of  enormous  transaction  costs  articulate  its  whopping  proof.  As  it  has 
been figured out corruption is an unlawful treaty and therefore its opera-
tion costs are gigantic. Corruption violates the rule of commandment and 
under such state of affairs there is no shield of private property rights 
and no concord enforcement. This is the indirect way in which corruption 
fade away economic efficiency and consequently social welfare. Corrup-
tion increases basic business vagueness, particularly regarding protection 
of property rights. This kind of vagueness decreases the anticipated profit 
rate for prospective investors. Investor decision making rooted in predict-
able profit or rate of returns that are likely less under such state of affairs 
which make them hesitant to take an investment judgment. Since cor-
ruption decreases projected returns on investment and consequently evi-
dence lower growth rates (Begovic, 2005). 
Corruption might endorse economic growth as it relaxes unproduc-
tive and inflexible regulations forced by government Leff (1964). Since 
the  mid  1980‘s  several  economists  have  distinguished  mechanisms  in 
which corruption enhances efficiency and promotes growth. Queue model 
argues  that  bureaucrats  while  allocating  business  licenses  to  firms  be-
stow priority to those who appraise time at the utmost value and corrupt 
the bureaucrats into speeding up proceedings (Lui, 1985). Auction mod-
els arguing that bribes in a bidding progression can push competence be-
cause the majority efficient firms are often those who can pay for the Page 19  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
highest  bribe  (Beck  and  Maher,  1986).  Bargaining  procedure  between 
public and private sectors enables private agents to purchase their way 
out of politically obligatory inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Cor-
ruption may formulate potential smaller or no salary payments to officials 
who if cautiously supervised will still perform their functions on a fee-for-
service basis (Tullock, 1996). 
Some economists may disagree that corruption may work as the se-
cond-best  solution  to  market  distortions  forced  by  government  actions 
and policies at least in the short run. In the long run, however, corruption 
itself fabricates additional market distortions and reduces market efficien-
cy. Effects of Corruption are dual in nature on the constructive surface it 
can endorse attainment of allocative efficiency while on the other side of 
the picture it can render the economic growth of the economy as it vio-
lates the rule of law which is a prerequisite for the market economy. Alt-
hough the first effect still remains a substance of debate, there seems to 
be  no  theoretical  disagreement  for  the  latter  one.  Studies  spotlight  to 
test negative effect of corruption on economic growth (Lui, 1996). 
Corruption is not a problem that can be addressed in seclusion. It is 
not  ample  for  the  criminal  law  to  search  for  bad  apples  and  penalize 
them.  For  sure  the  state  may  need  to  establish  integrity  by  punishing 
highly noticeable corrupt officials but the goal of such prosecutions is to 
magnetize notice and public support not resolve the principal dilemma. 
Anticorruption laws can only offer a environment for more vital structural 
reforms (Rose Ackerman, 1999). Pakistan is unfortunately way down on 
the ladder on this account. Corruption in various forms is prevailing in 
Pakistan  incepting  from  widespread  financial  and  political  corruption, 
nepotism and bribery to the theft of state possessions (Chene, 2008). Po-
litical corruption takes place at the highest levels of political authority. It 
is when the politicians and political decision-makers (heads of state, min-
isters and top officials), who are allowed to fashion, launch and execute 
the laws in the name of the people, are themselves corrupt (Andvig and Page 20  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
Fjeldstad, 2000).  
It has been comprehensively accepted now that corruption hinders 
economic growth.  Economic consequences of corruption consist of low 
labor output, reduced investment, and as a result shoddier growth. The 
countries with high corruption stages  have inferior  economic  presenta-
tion. Corruption outcomes in the form of condensed domestic and foreign 
direct investment, flashy government expenditure away from education, 
health,  and  maintenance  of  infrastructure,  near  to  less  proficient  pro-
jects.  Corruption  harmfully  impact  on  investment  climate;  it  has  been 
found  in  different  cases  across  countries  that  corruption  significantly 
slows down foreign direct investment and stream of foreign aid. If cor-
ruption decreases domestic and foreign investment one would deem that 
it would also trim down economic growth (Soomro, 1999). There exist 
negative connection among corruption and economic growth. It diverts 
assets from poor to the rich; increases the cost of running businesses, 
distorts public expenditures, and deters foreign investment. In adding up 
corruption has awful effect on human development, and increases cost of 
fundamental social services (Obayelu, 2007). 
Since both corruption and economic growth are highly rated on the 
development policy agenda the question arises as to whether and how 
they are related to each other. It is commonly assumed that both have 
negative relationship and corruption encumber economic growth. Over-
whelming body of empirical evidence suggests that the impact of corrup-
tion  on  economic  growth  and  development  is  highly  devastating  and 
there  are  a  number  of  channels  through  which  the  negative  effects  of 
corruption  are  transmitted  to  the  economy.  Corruption  should  not  be 
viewed merely as an administrative problem. This issue has economic di-
mensions as well and requires economic insight for its clarification. Eco-
nomic  reforms  aimed  at  simplifying  cumbersome  laws  and  procedures 
leads to eradicate inefficient rules and regulations.  
 Page 21  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
There‘s  without  doubt  that  Pakistan  is  facing  lots 
of economic problems, a few of which are extremely grave in magnitude 
and depth  however corruption is painstaking as the most central dilem-
ma which require instant courtesy. This study attempts to find out its im-
pacts on the economic growth of Pakistan.  
The  study  divides  n  to  the  following  sections:  after  introduction 
which is presented in Section 1 above, Section 2 shows literature review. 
Data source and methodological framework are presented in Section 3. 
Results are discussed in Section 4. Final section concludes the study. 
 
Literature Review 
There is an increasing volume of literature on the relationship be-
tween  corruption  and  economic  growth,  and  the  general  conclusion  is 
that corruption slows down the long-term growth of an economy through 
a wide range of channels. Hines (1995) viewing that US airplane exports 
after  1977  decreased  in  countries  supposed  to  be  corrupt.  These  out-
comes are however not enough to argue that the USA has a aggressive 
disadvantage,  since  they  could  just  as  well  designate  that  competitive 
advantages  in  corrupt  marketplaces  before  1977  had  been  neutralized 
subsequently. Mauro (1995) considers that negative relationship among 
corruption and investment is important, both in a numerical and in an 
economic logic. For example, if Bangladesh were to get better honesty 
and effectiveness of its bureaucracy to rank of that of Uruguay, its in-
vestment rate would increase by about five percentage points and its an-
nual GDP growth rate would increase by over half a percentage point. Ev-
ans and Rauch (1996) investigate the impact of merit-based enrolment 
on  corruption  in  35  developing  countries.  Higher  values  in  the  merit- 
based enrolment index are linked with a greater amount of higher-level 
officials in the interior economic agencies to be either in control of a uni-
versity degree or to go through the civil service through a proper exami-Page 22  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
nation system. While calculating for income, this index is negatively re-
lated with corruption. 
La Porta et al. (1997) argue that trust can be useful in combating 
corruption, since it helps bureaucrats to better collaborate with each oth-
er and with private nation. In a sample of 33 countries, the authors ex-
plain that trust has a considerable negative impact on corruption, while 
controlling for GDP per head. Mauro (1997) created significant outcome 
which argued that corruption mainly impacts on the accumulation of capi-
tal, which can be resulting from the ratio of investment to GDP, but it 
does not undoubtedly cause the efficiency of capital, because otherwise a 
link between corruption and growth of GDP should be noticeable. Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997) study impact of corruption on quality of investments 
referring to panel data on corruption from PRS( Political Risk Service) for 
1980- 95, the authors imply that corruption lowers quality of infrastruc-
ture as measured by condition of smooth roads and power outages. They 
support their hypothesis by reporting a high significance in their statisti-
cal  results.  However,  based  on  own  regressions  for  a  cross-section  of 
countries using the TI (Transparency International) index for 1998 it was 
not possible to repeat the significant results. This sheds some doubt on 
the strength of conclusion to different methodologies. 
Brunetti and Weder (1998) explain that a free press successfully de-
ters corruption. The concluding variables consist of "laws and regulations 
that manipulate media content", "political control over media content", 
"economic  influence  over  media  content"  and  "repressive  actions"  as 
compiled by Freedom House. These four part index and a collective index 
of press freedom all impact harmfully on the level of corruption in various 
condition. Gupta et al. (1998) argued that corruption increases income 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. In a cross-section of 37 
countries, found a significant positive impact of corruption on inequality, 
while taking into account various other exogenous variables. The authors 
find further verification that corruption increases inequality in education Page 23  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
and land distribution. Since these variables contribute to income inequali-
ty (and had been controlled in the first regression) overall impact of cor-
ruption on income inequality may even be stronger. 
Mauro (1998) finds that corruption lowers expenditure on education, 
disagreeing  that  other  expenditures  recommend  public  servants  en-
hanced opportunities to save bribes. His results hold for a variety of con-
dition but may bear a little from the low descriptive power of the regres-
sions. 
Alesina  and  Weder  (1999)  investigated  whether  corrupt  govern-
ments attract or discourage aid from OECD countries and also make use 
of a variety of different measures of corruption and investigate different 
samples of countries. Testing for various specifications of regressions, the 
authors  do  not  find  evidence  that  corrupt  countries  are  discriminated 
against by foreign donors. Some results suggest that corrupt countries 
are even more appropriate to attract foreign aid from OECD countries. 
Fisman and Gatti (1999) make use of variables on decentralization, but 
tests  whether  outcome  is  strong  to  inclusion  of  other  variables.  For  a 
wide range of specifications they find a strong negative relationship be-
tween fiscal decentralization in government expenditure and corruption. 
Lambsdorff (1999) present linking corruption to capital productivity .The 
ratio of GDP to capital stock is interpreted as a macroeconomic measure 
of the average capital productivity. The capital stock is determined as ac-
cumulated and depreciated investments. In a cross-section of 69 coun-
tries  a  significant  negative  impact  of  corruption  on  this  ratio  is  found, 
while controlling for the total capital stock and testing for various other 
variables. Leite and Weidemann (1999) argue that plenty of natural re-
sources  create  opportunities  for  rent-seeking  activities  and  increase  to 
corruption. The results emerge to be strong for a diversity of specifica-
tions. Treisman (1999) concerned with the impact of decentralization on 
corruption, has been involved in theoretical discussions telling conflicting 
viewpoints. He found significant verification that federal states are more Page 24  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
corrupt than national ones. But this relationship fell to irrelevance when 
other variables had been incorporated. Therefore, while the dummy vari-
able measuring federalism was shown to compare with corruption, this 
conclusion was not strong to the addition of other variables. Above that, 
a dummy variable may not effectively imprison all facets of decentraliza-
tion. 
Weder (1999) conduct regressions of corruption on FDIs in a cross 
section of countries test a range of different terms and explanatory varia-
bles. They terminate that for almost no specification the impact of cor-
ruption is significant at conventional levels. In addition the indication of 
an impact of corruption on FDIs is diverse. Wei (1999) reviews the practi-
cal  work  and  provides  new  proof  on  the  association  among  corruption 
and growth. The conclusion to be resulting from Wei‘s study is that coun-
tries  with  high  levels  of  corruption  be  inclined  to  trace  poor  economic 
performance. The unfavourable effect of corruption on growth and devel-
opment are reported to answer from reduced domestic investment, dis-
courage foreign direct investment, extravagance in government and in-
distinct work of government spending. He discusses a variety of policy 
options, as well as reforming the government's role in economy; merit-
based  enrolment  and  support  of  civil  servants;  paying  civil  servants  a 
spirited salary in relative to related jobs in the private sector; and inter-
national force on countries with high levels of corruption. 
Mo (2000) investigated the impact of corruption on economic growth 
and channels during which it affects growth with data similar to Mauro 
(1995).  He  establish  that  a  1%  boost  in  the  corruption  level  reduces 
growth rate by regarding 0.72% and  most significant channel is political 
instability, accounting for regarding 53% of whole result. He also estab-
lishes that corruption lowers level of human capital and share of private 
investment. Pulok (2000) study the long run relationship between eco-
nomic growth and corruption in Bangladesh over the period 1984-2008. 
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form  for  total  factor  productivity  and  three  other  channels  to  demon-
strate impact of corruption on real GDP per capita. To examine empirical-
ly the survival of a long run relationship between corruption and real GDP 
per  capita, author  use  Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds 
Test method. The outcomes of co-integration test verify that there is a 
long run relationship between corruption, GDP per capita and other de-
terminants of GDP over study period. The long run estimation specifies 
that corruption has direct negative impact on per  capita GDP i.e. eco-
nomic development of Bangladesh. Brempong (2001) examine the effects 
of corruption on economic growth and income distribution by using panel 
data from African countries and a dynamic panel estimator. Author ﬁnds 
that corruption reduces economic growth directly and indirectly through 
reduced investment in material capital. A unit rise in corruption decreas-
es the growth rates of GDP and per capita income among 0.75 and 0.9 
percentage points and between 0.39 and 0.41 percentage points per year 
correspondingly. The outcome also specifies that improved corruption is 
positively linked with income inequality. The joint effects of reduced in-
come growth and increased inequality propose that corruption harms the 
poor more than the rich in African countries. 
Fisman and Svensson (2001) apply firm-survey data of predictable 
corrupt expenses of Ugandan firms to learn the correlation between cor-
rupt expenses to government officials, taxes and firm growth which ex-
pose  that both rate of duty and bribery are negatively connected with 
firm growth. For complete data set, 1 percentage point boost in the brib-
ery  rate  is  connected  with  a  decrease  in  firm  growth  of  3  percentage 
points, a result that is about three times larger than that of taxation. Mo 
(2001) anticipated a direct and indirect effect of corruption on economic 
growth by means  of along expression growth rates of per  capital GDP 
from 1970 to 1985. Author recognizes three transmission controls that is, 
investment, human capital and political stability. A regression is run by 
means of corruption perception index of Transparency International, vari-
ables calculating  three transmission  channels and other  manage varia-Page 26  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
bles. The result specifies that one unit raise in the corruption index de-
creases growth rate by about0.545 percentage point. However, the direct 
effect of corruption turns into insignificant in both ordinary least squares 
(OLS)  and  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS)  estimation  after  calculating 
further variables. Easterly (2003) demonstrates that practical inefficiency 
caused by corruption affects growth not directly by lowering investment 
rate and directly by primary to misallocation of investment between sec-
tors. For example, a one standard deviation development in the bureau-
cratic efficiency indicator is linked with a 1.3 percentage point boost in 
the yearly growth rate of GDP per capita. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) 
study the effects of corruption on investment, schooling, trade policy and 
political stability, and approximate the contribution of a variety of chan-
nels to general negative effects of corruption on growth. They conclude 
that the effects of corruption on growth are equally straight and not di-
rect through its impact on investment, schooling, trade openness and po-
litical stability. 
Abbey (2005) demonstrates that corrupt politicians, with facilitate of 
dishonest bureaucrats, over the world be inclined to prefer investment 
projects  not  on  foundation  of  their  inherent  economic  value  but  on 
chance for bribes and kickbacks these projects near and the final wound-
ed are ordinary people. So, political corruption has long-term impact on 
economic growth because politicians are imaginary to guide the country 
for economic wealth. Akai et al. (2005) measures the rate of economic 
growth  for  different  time  duration—short  (1998–2000),  middle  (1995–
2000)  and  long  (1991–2000)—using  earlier  uninvestigated  state-level 
cross-section  data  for  the  United  States.  Our  two-stage  least  square 
(2SLS) estimate with  a carefully preferred set of implements show that 
the effect of  corruption on economic growth  is definitely negative and 
statistically significant in the middle and long durations but insignificant 
in short span. 
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Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) analysis the empirical literature on the 
economic  costs  of  corruption.  Corruption  affects  economic  growth,  the 
level of GDP per capita, investment activity, international trade and price 
stability negatively. They estimate the effect of corruption on economic 
growth and GDP per capita as well as on six probable transmission con-
trols. The outcome of this study permits to estimate the total effect of 
corruption: A raise of corruption by about one index position decreases 
GDP growth by 0.13 percentage points and GDP per capita by  425 US$. 
Méon and Sekkat (2005) explain relationship between impact of corrup-
tion on growth and quality of governance in a sample of 63 to 71 coun-
tries during 1970 to 1998. Result shows that there is negative relation 
between corruptions with economic growth. Mironov (2005) investigates 
the effect of corruption on economic growth in 141 countries from 1996 
to 2004. Author discovers that bad corruption, or corruption which is re-
lated with poor organizations, has a negative effect on GDP growth. How-
ever, residual corruption, or corruption which is uncorrelated with other 
governance individuality is positively associated to GDP growth in coun-
tries with poor organizations. A study of financial data from more than 
9000 companies in 51 countries brings related outcomes: residual cor-
ruption is positively associated with capital accumulation and productivity 
growth in developing countries.  
Brempong  and  Camacho  (2006)  reveal  that  there  are  statistically 
important local differences in income and growth presentation due to cor-
ruption. For example, 1 percentage raise in corruption decreases growth 
rate of per capita income by about 1.7% in OECD and Asian countries, by 
about 2.6% in Latin American countries, and by 2.8% in African coun-
tries. 1 standard deviation boost in corruption increases the Gini coeffi-
cient of income inequality among 0.05 and 0.33 points .So, corruption in-
creases  the  variation  among  rich  and  poor  which  is  a  main  reason  of 
common conflict in rising countries. Buse and Hefeker (2006) investigat-
ed relations between institutions, political threat, and foreign direct in-
vestment inflows by both cross-sectional and cross-sectional time-series Page 28  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
investigation. The sample size covers 83 developing countries in period 
1984-2003. Their conclusion showed that government stability, internal 
and external conflict, corruption and ethnic tensions, law and order, dem-
ocratic accountability of government, and quality of bureaucracy are ex-
tremely important determinants of foreign investment inflows. 
Drury et al. (2006) analysed that political processes such as democ-
racy  and  corruption  are  significant  aspects  in  determining  economic 
growth. They show that democracy has only indirect effects on growth, 
while corruption is generally a direct and negative impact on economic 
performance. They disagree that one of democracy's indirect benefits is 
its capability to lessen harmful effect of corruption on economic growth. 
While  corruption  definitely  occurs  in  democracies,  electoral  mechanism 
slow down politicians from engaging in corrupt performs that spoil gener-
ally  economic  performance  and  thereby  expose  their  political  survival. 
Using time-series cross-section data for  more than 100 countries from 
1982–97, they show that corruption has no significant effect on economic 
growth in democracies, while non-democracies bear significant economic 
destruction from corruption. Farida and Esfahani (2006) study the impact 
of corruption on economic growth in Lebanon. Using a neoclassical mod-
el, they hypothesize that corruption decreases the country‘s standard of 
livelihood as calculated by real per capita GDP. They explain that corrup-
tion discourages growth not directly through falling the factor input effi-
ciency  in  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function.  They  present  pragmatic 
proof signifying that corruption increases inefficiencies in government ex-
penditure  and  decreases  investment  and  human  capital  productivity, 
leading to a negative impact on output. The implications of the analysis 
are explored. 
Mendez  and  Sepulveda  (2006)  study  the  special effects  of  cor-
ruption  on  long-run  growth  by including procedures of political liberty 
as a input determinant of the connection. They establish facts  of  a  non-
monotonic  connection  among  corruption  and  growth  after  calculating  Page 29  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
for  a number of additional economic variables. They prove that corrup-
tion has a positive impact on long-run  growth  at  low  levels  of  occur-
rence  but  is  negative  at  high  levels,  representing  that  the  growth-
maximizing level of corruption is considerably larger than zero.  This re-
sult, however, was established to be strong only in a sub-sample of coun-
tries that have attained a high level of political freedom. 
Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) calculated the effects of corruption on 
long-run growth by incorporating procedures of political liberty as a key 
determinant  of  the  association.  They  establish  verification  of  a  non-
monotonic relationship between corruption and growth after calculating 
for some other economic variables. They explain that corruption has a 
advantageous impact on long- growth at low levels of occurrence but is 
critical at high levels, representing that the growth-maximizing level of 
corruption is considerably greater than zero. N‘zue and N‘guessan (2006) 
analyze the connection among corruption, poverty and growth in a panel 
of 18 African countries for 1996-2001 time periods. Indicators of poverty 
and  corruption  were  recognized  and  tests  of  the  causal  relationship 
among these variables were performed using panel data study. The em-
pirical results propose that, it is poverty that causes growth but not the 
further way around. This means that past sequence of position of human 
development help advance calculation on growth; it is the state of growth 
that causes corruption and inequality; It is corruption that causes ine-
quality;  corruption  and  poverty  together  cause  growth;  poverty  and 
growth  together  cause  corruption;  and  finally,  inequality  together  with 
growth cause corruption. 
Dreher and Gassebner (2007) investigates impact of regulations on 
entrepreneurship  depends  on  corruption.  Empirical  analysis  shows  that 
corruption is beneficial in highly regulated economies. So, corruption sig-
nificantly  increases  entrepreneurial  activity.  Results  show  that  there  is 
positive  relation  between  corruption  and  economic  growth.  Obayelu 
(2007) gives a general thought of the Nigeria‘s current incident on cor-Page 30  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
ruption in perspective of economic reforms programme. It discusses pos-
sible causes and effects of corruption, which are seen to be embedded in 
socio-cultural practices and political and economic situation of the coun-
try. Data were drawn mostly from news stories, and commissions of en-
quiry, interviews of Nigerians with appropriate information and personal 
knowledge of Nigeria. The results of study show that  there have been 
significant reductions in level of corruption in the country through intro-
duction of government anti-corruption instruments and also found a neg-
ative relationship between levels of corruption and economic growth thus 
making it complicated for Nigeria to develop fast. Shaw (2007) prepares 
a macroeconomic model to discover impact educational corruption may 
have on growth, educational achievement, and education wage premium. 
He finds that model can create a negative correlation among economic 
growth and educational corruption as well as a positive correlation among 
education  wage  premium  and  educational  corruption.  Results  conclude 
that borrowing constraints can worsen the impact educational corruption 
has on economic growth, the wage premium, and educational achieve-
ment rates. 
Aliyu  et  al.(2008)  examine  the  impact  of  corruption  on  economic 
growth in Nigeria from 1986 to 2007. A Barro-type endogenous growth 
model was assumed. The Engle-Granger (1987) cointegration and error 
correction mechanism (ECM) techniques were engaged to unit root prop-
erties of variables, their long run relationship and to establish principles 
of long run factors. The outcome explain that corruption apply important 
direct effect on economic growth and not directly through some signifi-
cant  variables  observed  which  consist  of  Government  Capital  Expendi-
ture, Human Capital Development and Total employment. They find out 
that about 20% of raise in government capital expenditure split ends in 
confidential  pockets.  Ali  (2008)  use  available  corruption  index  as 
measures  of  corruption  in  a  corruption-growth  model  that  is  useful  to 
cross-sectional data covering 141 countries in 1996, corruption is origi-
nate to have a significant positive relationship with economic growth for Page 31  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
two of corruption index. However, no particular significant correlation is 
found to exist for East Asian countries within sample. The corruption in-
dex are then joint to generate a single index of corruption which is then 
used in a corruption-growth model and apply to panel data covering 33 
countries over a 20 years period from 1984 to 2003. This time corruption 
variable is found to have a significant positive correlation with economic 
growth for East Asian countries (excluding Singapore) during 1986-1996. 
Podobnik et al. (2008) examine the reliance of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita growth rates on changes in the Corruption Per-
ceptions Index (C P I). For the period 1999–2004 for all countries in the 
world, they ﬁnd on common that a raise of C P  I by one unit lead to an 
increase of the annual GDP per capita growth rate by 1.7%. By retreating 
only the European countries with evolution economies, they ﬁnd that a 
raise of C P I by one unit produces an increase of the annual GDP per 
capita growth rate by 2.4%. They establish a new measure to calculate 
the relative corruption among countries based on their individual wealth 
as calculated by GDP per capita. Asiedu and Freeman (2009)  apply ﬁrm-
level data on investment and measures corruption at the ﬁrm and coun-
try level, and allocate the result of corruption to differ by area. Depend-
ent variable is ﬁrms‘ investment growth and they use six measures of 
corruption from four dissimilar basis—two ﬁrm-level measures and four 
country-level  measures.  They  ﬁnd  that  effect  of  corruption  on  invest-
ments  differs  signiﬁcantly  across  areas:  corruption  has  a  negative  and 
signiﬁcant effect on investment growth for ﬁrms in changeover countries 
but has no signiﬁcant impact for ﬁrms in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Additionally, for Transition countries, corruption is mainly signifi-
cant determinant of investment. 
Ling and Nordahl (2011) investigate the levels of supposed corrup-
tion in a cross-section of countries have affected their economic growth 
rates over the years 2004-2008. The study is approved with four regres-
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period. The  models  are  created  on  the  origin  of  both  the  neoclassi-
cal growth theory and the endogenous growth theory. The establish out-
comes disagree with the predictable outcome; it explains that the sup-
posed  levels  of  corruption  are    considerably  and  positively  associated  
with  economic  growth.  It    is  however  establish    that    countries    with  
common  corruption,  in  universal developing  countries,  have  knowl-
edgeable  high  economic  growth  in excess of  these years.  Vaal and 
Ebben (2011) study the effects of bureaucratic corruption on economic 
growth in a structure that takes into account that corruption also affects 
growth throughout its impact on institutions. They use a proper growth 
structure in which corruption affects growth negatively because of indi-
vidual rent-seeking and theft of public goods, but where corruption may 
provide a positive role by taking over the position of institutions. They 
find that overall effect of corruption on economic growth is extremely de-
pendent  on  the  institutional  setting  of  a  country.  Mostly  in  conditions 
where institutions are not well developed corruption may be favourable 
to economic growth.  
Igwike et al. (2012) observed the relationship among corruption and 
economic development with help of some empirical tests. They composed 
data from about 100 countries for the period 2000 to 2009 and engaged 
the annual growth rate of gross domestic product to measure economic 
development and Corruption Perception Index accumulated and available 
by Transparency International to measure corruption in selected set of 
countries. The result of selecting some variables and years is pooled data 
set. They used fixed effects and random effects models to check the rela-
tionships. They found that corruption has a negative impact on economic 
growth and also hold for the fixed effects model and partial verification of 
a two-way relationship among the variables. Otahal and Grochova (2012) 
explain theoretical structure that is related to problem of corruption and 
expose its purpose difficulties. They dispute that corruption in common is 
problem of lawful setting and its enforcement and, if poorly recognized, it 
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presenting whether corruption harms or not economic growth in Central 
and Eastern Europe. They use Granger causality test to show that corrup-
tion leads economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe which means 
that lawful setting  and its enforcement slightly permit  for rent-seeking 
than support economic growth. They highlight the requirement to focus 
on  institutional  structure  to  fight  corruption  and  maintain  economic 
growth. 
Corruption has been around for a very long time and will be around 
in the future unless governments figure out effective ways to combat it. 
Various anti-corruption strategies have been designed and implemented. 
 
Data Source and Methodical Framework 
Time series data was used for per capita GDP, domestic investment, 
government  expenditures,  population  growth,  education  expenditures 
and corruption index in Pakistan. All the data was obtained from World 
Bank Development indicator (WDI, 2010), Economic survey of Pakistan 
(various editions) Transparency International (TI) and IFS (2010). 
To estimate impact of corruption on growth, data over annual fre-
quencies  from  1990-2010  was  used  on  various  variables  that  was  ob-
tained from said sources. Sample size was reduced to only 21 observa-
tion because lack of data arability from available sources. 
 
Theoretical Model 
Neoclassical model of economic growth explicitly include effects of 
corruption on economic growth. This modelling approach helps to com-
pute effect of corruption on economic growth perhaps better than preced-
ing studies that employ variety of approaches that pay no attention to 
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Our theoretical model suggests that output and growth are influenced by 
the level of corruption (Farida and Esfahani, 2006).  
Since  the  seminal  works  by  Kormendi  and  Meguire  (1985),  Barro 
(1991) and, The modern growth literature even though fairly broad, has 
focused on the same specification. Institutional and political determinants 
of growth have also extensively used the identical technique (Mankiw et 
al.  1992).  It  has  then  become  standard  to  articulate  growth  rate  of  a 
specified period as a blend of a few explanatory variables. The economic 
variables that are typically included to explain this relationships are: do-
mestic investment, population growth, government expenditure etc.  
Y = f(K,PG,GE,)                 (1) 
Where 
Y   is average growth rate of per capita income over the period 
K         is domestic investment 
PG       is population growth 
GE       is government expenditure 
 
Depending on the rationale of the empirical analysis additional ex-
planatory  variables  can  also  integrated.  The  objective  of  the  present 
study is to examine how corruption effect economic growth. Hence, two 
additional sets of explanatory variables are also considered. One refers to 
corruption indices while the other concerns measures education expendi-
ture.  
Y = f( K, PG, GE, CO, EDE)            (2) 
where 
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K     domestic investment in US $ million. 
PG   population growth rate  
GE   government expenditures as percentage of GDP 
EDE  education expenditures as percentage of GDP and 
CO   corruption index 
 
The cross-state indicator of corruption is attained from Boylan and 
Long (2002), who presented a survey of state house reporters‘ percep-
tions of public corruption in their  state in 1998. State house reporters 
were asked to rate the level of corruption between all employees in the 
state government (as well as selected officials, political appointees, and  
civil servants) on a scale from one to seven (least corrupt to most cor-
rupt). The standard of such ―local‖ reporters‘ views is used as a measure 
of corruption in each state. Note that the Corruption Index is calculated 
in 1998. Basically, however, the Corruption Index is calculated only once 
in a particular year throughout the period of research. This index is found 
on state house reporters‘ perceptions, which may be formed by observa-
tions and practices over more than any particular year.  
In line with studies by Mo (2001) and Anorou and Braha (2004) in 
which  they  recognized  the    effects  of  corruption  on  economic  growth 
which is in line with specification of Barro‘s model, we adopt  the endoge-
nous growth model as it was said prior the model authorizes the inclusion 
of more policy variables in economic growth equation. Specifically, the 
model was modified to include the corruption index as one of its explana-
tory variables. As corruption is taken as an index so we didn‘t use log and 
difference with corruption. Then the estimated equation will be specified 
as: 
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log(GR) =   β0 + β1 log(K) + β2 log(PG) +  
      β3 log(GE) + β4(CO) + β5 log(EDE) +μ  (3) 
where 
β0=  is constant 
β1= is coefficient of log(K) 
β2= is coefficient of log(PG) 
β3= is coefficient of log(GE) 
β4= is coefficient of (CO) 
β5= is coefficient of log(EDE)  
µ= Error term 
 
We estimate the above equation using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
following Mo (2001) and Anorou and Braha (2004) to capture the effect 
of corruption on growth rate. 
As the data we used in time series which exhibit property of non-
stationarity, as we examined it by using ADF test (Gujrati, 2004). The re-
sulting ADF test shows that all the variables are non-stationary 1(0) at 
levels and stationary at first difference 1(1). So we modify our estimated 
equation as follows. 
dlog(GR)=   β0 + β1dlog(K) + β2dlog(PG) +  
      β3dlog(GE) + β4(CO) + β5dlog(EDE) + µ1  (4) 
where 
dlog(GR) = first difference and log(GR) 
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dlog(PG) = first difference and log(PG) 
dlog(GE) = first difference and log(GE) 
(CO) = Corruption Index 
dlog(EDE) = first difference and log(EDE) 
µ = Error term 
 
After estimating the above models, we subjected them into a num-
ber  of  testes  for  the  detection  of  econometric  problems.  ARCH,  Histo-
gram, CUSUM, CUSUM of squares, Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM 
Test was used for the detection of econometric problems. 
 
Results and Discussions 
We started with testing the data for stationarity, unit root test was 
used to observe the stationarity of time series data. Often time series da-
ta show the property of non-Stationarity i-e mean, variance and auto-
covariance  does  not  stay  same  no  matter  at  what  point  we  calculate 
them, the regression of this non-stationarity data will be specious and we 
can study its actions only for the time period under contemplation. So 
data of all the variables was tested for stationarity to convert them in a 
probable position and hence forecasting may become possible. 
The data was experienced for unit root (non-stationary) by using the 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test. Through Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
and Phillip-Perron test, the stationarity of each variable can be checked. 
The standard regression method can be applied if the variables are found 
to be stationary. If the variables are non-stationary in their levels, then 
the regression will generate spurious results. The results from Augment-
ed Dicky- Fuller unit root test (see, Table 1) are indicative of the fact that Page 38  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
all the variables are non-stationarity at level while stationary at first dif-
ference. 
 
Models are the direct and mathematical form of a statement. Models 
are used for future predication and forecasting. By shifting the value of a 
factor  (independent  variable)  we  can  predict  its  effects  on  output 
(dependent variable). The linear model specified in equation (3) has been 
used to approximate the impact of corruption on economic growth by us-
ing ordinary least squares (OLS) method. After building the data station-
ary we run the regression as per equation (3) for parameter estimates 
their relevant standard errors, t- ratios and P-values are given in the Ta-
ble 2. 
The results shows that government expenditures, education expend-
itures and population growth has a positive impact on per capita GDP, 
however, domestic investment and corruption has a negative impact on 
per capita income in Pakistan. It implies that corruption is a major factor 
impeding economic development. Corruption hampers economic growth, 
disproportionately burdens the poor and undermines the effectiveness of 
investment and aid. The results are inline with the previous studies of 
Obayelu(2007) ,  Méon and Sekkat (2005) and Pulok (2000).  
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The empirical results, given in Table 2, appear to be very good in 
terms of the usual diagnostic statistics. The value of Radjusted indicates 
that 56.4% variation in dependent variable has been explained by varia-
tions  in  independent  variables.  F  value  is  higher  than  its  critical  value 
suggesting a good overall significance of the estimated model. Therefore, 
fitness of the model is acceptable empirically. The Durbin Watson Test 
shows that there is no such autocorrelation problem exist in the model as 
its value is 2. LM test and ARCH test both suggests that there is no prob-
lem of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the model. 
 
Conclusions 
 The  primary  objective  of  this  study  is  to  significantly  evaluate  
the  impact  of  corruption  on economic  growth  in  Pakistan.  To  ac-
complish  this  objective,  the  core  channels  through  which corruption  
affects  growth  were  recognized  in  both  the  literature  and  empirical  
studies.  These channels include per capita GDP, population growth, do-
mestic  investment,  education  expenditures,  government  expenditures 
and corruption index. Page 40  Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 5, Issue 3, Summer 2013 
 
This study uses the Ordinary Least Square method to estimate effect 
of corruption on economic growth equation. We have used the estimated 
OLS model to infer a long run relationship between economic growth and 
other variables including domestic investment, population growth, educa-
tion expense, government expenditure and corruption index. This rela-
tionship is then used to estimate effect of corruption on economic growth 
in  Pakistan..  The  study  confirms  the  negative  impact  of  corruption  on 
economic growth in Pakistan over the period 1985-2010. The OLS model 
shows that 1% increase in corruption decreases the economic growth by 
0.36% during the period under consideration. The existence of corruption 
is a subject of severe concern for the government and policy makers. The 
presence of corruption not only causes massive losses economy but also 
causes inefficiencies for policy makers.  
Some of the important policy recommendations regarding to corrup-
tions are: 
1.  In order to successfully combat corruption, there must be the 
proper mechanism that will transform dramatically the culture 
and legacy of corruption in Pakistan. 
2.  Government of Pakistan should take proper measures to keep 
check and balance on all the economic activities to avoid the 
corruption as it hinders the economic growth in the long-run. 
3.  The efficiency of the Judiciary should be enhanced through po-
litical support by government of Pakistan because lack of sov-
ereign judiciary can enhance occurrence of corruption as such 
form  of  judicial  system  dishonoured  by  bribery  deteriorate 
confidence  in  supremacy  by  facilitating  corruption  across  all 
sectors of government.  
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